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To The Public Bodies and Officers,

It has come to my attention the unconstitutional practice and insurrection of the use of trespass; regarding cases in probate.

It has also, brings attention to the conflict of interest with the court's(B.A.R. members). law enforcement agencies, guardians, guardian ad litems, nursing homes(or any care placement), Adult Protective Service, Licensing And Regulator Agency, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security ACT, Michigan Attorney General, and Ombudsmen. This conflict with unconstitutional process creates a pattern and practice of weaponization, rooted in fraud upon the court.

Below are cite's for foundation to educate you on the types of Due Process

Amdt14.S1.3 Due Process Generally
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides that no state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.[1] The Supreme Court has applied the Clause in two main contexts. First, the Court has construed the Clause to provide protections that are similar to those of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause except that, while the Fifth Amendment applies to federal government actions, the Fourteenth Amendment binds the states.[2] The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees procedural due process, meaning that government actors must follow certain procedures before they may deprive a person of a protected life, liberty, or property interest.[3] The Court has also construed the Clause to protect substantive due process, holding that there are certain fundamental rights that the government may not infringe even if it provides procedural protections.[4]
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt14-S1-3/ALDE_00013743/#:~:text=The%20Fourteenth%20Amendment's%20Due%20Process%20Clause%20guarantees%20procedural%20due%20process,%2C%20liberty%2C%20or%20property%20interest.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. For discussion of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, see Amdt5.5.1 Overview of Due Process.
3. See Amdt14.S1.5.1 Overview of Procedural Due Process to Amdt14.S1.5.8.2 Protective Commitment and Due Process.

4. See Amdt14.S1.6.1 Overview of Substantive Due Process to Amdt14.S1.6.5.3 Civil Commitment and Substantive Due Process.

Second, the Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to render many provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.[5] As originally ratified, the Bill of Rights restricted the actions of the federal government but did not limit the actions of state governments. However, following ratification of the Reconstruction Amendment, the Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to impose on the states many of the Bill of Rights' limitations, a doctrine sometimes called incorporation against the states through the Due Process Clause. Litigants bringing constitutional challenges to state government action often invoke the doctrines of procedural or substantive due process or argue that state action violates the Bill of Rights, as incorporated against the states. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has thus formed the basis for many high-profile Supreme Court cases.[6]

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Supreme Court has held that this protection extends to all natural persons (i.e., human beings), regardless of race, color, or citizenship.[7] The Court has also considered multiple cases about whether the word person includes artificial persons, meaning entities such as corporations. As early as the 1870s, the Court appeared to accept that the Clause protects corporations, at least in some circumstances. In the 1877 Granger Cases, the Court upheld various state laws without questioning whether a corporation could raise due process claims.[8] In a roughly contemporaneous case arising under the Fifth Amendment, the Court explicitly declared that the United States equally with the States . . . are prohibited from depriving persons or corporations of property without due process of law.[9] Subsequent decisions of the Court have held that a corporation may not be deprived of its property without due process of law.[10] By contrast, in multiple cases involving the liberty interest, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.[11]

5. *See* Amdt14.S1.4.1 Overview of Incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
6. Among numerous other examples, see, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
7. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216 (1923). See Hellenic Lines v. Rhodetis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970).
8. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
9. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718–19 (1879).
10. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522, 526 (1898); Kentucky Co. v. Paramount Exch., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923); Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
11. Nw. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); W. Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).

Nevertheless, the Court has at times allowed corporations to raise claims not based on the property interest. For instance, in a 1936 case, a newspaper corporation successfully argued that a state law deprived it of liberty of the press.12

A separate question concerns the ability of government officials to invoke the Due Process Clause to protect the interests of their office. Ordinarily, the mere official interest of a public officer, such as the interest in enforcing a law, does not enable him to challenge the constitutionality of a law under the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Moreover, municipal corporations lack standing to invoke the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in opposition to the will of their creator, the state.14 However, the Court has acknowledged that state officers have an interest in resisting an endeavor to prevent the enforcement of statutes in relation to which they have official duties, even if the officials have not sustained any private damage.15 State officials may therefore ask federal courts to review decisions of state courts declaring state statutes, which [they] seek to enforce, to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.16

12. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses). In First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), faced with the validity of state restraints upon expression by corporations, the Court did not determine that corporations have First Amendment liberty rights—and other constitutional rights—but decided instead that expression was protected, irrespective of the speaker, because of the interests of the listeners. See id. at 778 n.14. In Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits banning political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. While Citizens United involved federal regulation, it overruled a prior case that had upheld a related state regulation, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).

13. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889); Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Tyler v. Judges of Ct. of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 410 (1900); Straus v. Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162 (1913); Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96 (1931).

14. City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933). But see Madison Sch. Dist. v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.7 (1976) (reserving question whether municipal corporation as an employer has a First Amendment right assertable against a state).

15. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 442, 445 (1939); Boynton v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 291 U.S. 656 (1934); S.C. Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).

16. *Coleman*, 307 U.S. at 442–43. The converse is not true, however, and the interest of a state official in vindicating the Constitution provides no legal standing to attack the constitutionality of a state statute in order to avoid compliance with it. Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138 (1903); Braxton Cnty. Ct. v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192 (1908); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913); Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915). See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437–46 (1939).

Amdt14.S1.5.4.4 Opportunity for Meaningful Hearing

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

As a general matter, procedural due process requires an opportunity for a meaningful hearing to review a deprivation of a protected interest.[1] The Supreme Court has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty] interest.[2] This right is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment.[3] Thus, the notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.[4] However, the type of hearing required, and when the hearing must occur, depend on the specific circumstances at issue.

The Court has held that it is a violation of due process for a state to enforce a judgment against a party to a proceeding without having given him an opportunity to be heard sometime before final judgment is entered.[5] However, due process does not necessarily require affording a party the opportunity to present every available defense before entry of judgment. A person may be remitted to other actions initiated by him,[6] or an appeal may suffice. Accordingly, in one case the Court held that a company objecting to the entry of a judgment against it without notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of liability was not denied due process where the state provided the opportunity for a hearing on appeal from the judgment.[7]

1. E.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
2. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
3. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170–71 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
5. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
6. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65–69 (1972). However, if a person would suffer too severe an injury between the doing and the undoing, he may avoid the alternative means. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
7. Am. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932).

Nor could the company show a denial of due process based on the fact that it lost the opportunity for a hearing by inadvertently pursuing the wrong procedure in the state courts.8 On the other hand, where a state appellate court reversed a trial court and entered a final judgment for the defendant, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was denied due process because he did not have an opportunity to introduce evidence in rebuttal to testimony that the trial court deemed immaterial but the appellate court considered material.9

In interpreting the analogous Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court has held that due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable case of governmental impairment of private interest. For instance, the Court held that the summary exclusion on security grounds of a concessionaire's cook at the Naval Gun Factory, without hearing or advice as to the basis for the exclusion, did not violate due process.10

8. Id. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429–30, 432–33 (1982).
9. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
10. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). In so holding, the Court considered the historical power of a commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area of his command and applicable Navy regulations that confirm that authority, together with a stipulation in the contract between the restaurant concessionaire and the Naval Gun Factory forbidding employment on the premises of any person not meeting security requirements.

Manifesting a disposition to adjudicate on non-constitutional grounds employee dismissals under the Federal Loyalty Program, in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), the Court invalidated, as in excess of delegated authority, a Loyalty Review Board's finding of reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's loyalty that reopened his case on its own initiative after it had twice cleared him.

In Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956), also decided on the basis of statutory interpretation, the Court intimated that grave due process issues would be raised by applying to federal employees, not occupying sensitive positions, a measure which authorized, in the interest of national security, summary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals of allegedly disloyal employees by agency heads. In Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959), the Court nullified dismissals for security reasons by invoking an established administrative law rule that an administrator must comply with procedures outlined in applicable agency regulations, notwithstanding that such regulations conform to more rigorous substantive and procedural standards than Congress required or that the agency action is discretionary. In both of the last cited decisions, the Court set aside dismissals of employees as security risks because the employing agency failed to conform the dismissal to its established security regulations. See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).

Again avoiding constitutional issues, in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), the Court invalidated the security clearance procedure the Defense Department required from defense contractors as being unauthorized either by law or presidential order. However, the Court suggested that it would condemn, on grounds of denial of due process, any enactment or Executive Order that sanctioned a comparable department security clearance program, under which a defense contractor's employee could have his security clearance revoked without a hearing at which he had the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Justices Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall Harlan, and Charles Whittaker concurred without passing on the validity of such procedure, if authorized. Justice Tom Clark dissented. See also the dissenting opinions of Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo Black in Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41, 43 (1962), and in Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531, 533 (1963).

In Hannah v. Larche, the Court upheld rules of procedure adopted by the Civil Rights Commission, under which state electoral officials and others accused of discrimination were not apprised of the identity of their accusers or accorded a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses or accusers testifying at such hearings.11 In upholding the procedures, the Court opined that the Commission acts solely as an investigative and fact-finding agency and makes no adjudications. It further noted that additional procedural protections have not been granted by grand juries, congressional committees, or administrative agencies conducting purely fact-finding investigations that do not determine private rights.

With respect to actions taken by administrative agencies, the Court has held that the demands of due process do not require a hearing at the initial stage, or at any particular point in the proceeding, so long as a hearing is held before a final order becomes effective.12 In Bowles v. Willingham, the Court sustained orders fixing maximum rents issued without a hearing at any stage, saying that where Congress has provided for judicial review after the regulations or orders have been made effective it has done all that due process under the war emergency requires.13 But in another case where the National

Labor Relations Board undertook to void an agreement between an employer and a union after consideration of charges brought against the employer by an independent complaining union, the Court held that the union that formed the agreement was entitled to notice and an opportunity to participate in the proceedings.14 Although a taxpayer must be afforded a fair opportunity for a hearing in connection with the assessment of taxes,15 collection of taxes through summary administrative proceedings is lawful if the taxpayer is later afforded a hearing.16

11. 363 U.S. 420, 493, 499 (1960). Congress subsequently amended the law to require that any person who is defamed, degraded, or incriminated by evidence or testimony presented to the Commission be afforded the opportunity to appear and be heard in executive session, with a reasonable number of additional witnesses requested by him, before the Commission can make public such evidence or testimony. Further, any such person, before the evidence or testimony is released, must be afforded an opportunity to appear publicly to state his side and to file verified statements with the Commission which it must release with any report or other document containing defaming, degrading, or incriminating evidence or testimony. Pub. L. 91-521, § 4, 84 Stat. 1357 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(e)). Cf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
12. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152, 153 (1941).
13. 321 U.S. 503, 521 (1944).
14. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
15. Cent. of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
16. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). Cf. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 593 (1881); Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893). The collection of taxes is, however, very nearly a wholly unique area. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 127 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On the limitations on private prejudgment collection, see Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, held before a tribunal that meets currently prevailing standards of impartiality.17 A party must be given an opportunity not only to present evidence, but also to know the claims of the opposing party and to respond to them.18 In administrative proceedings, a variance between the initial charges and the agency's ultimate findings will not invalidate the proceedings where the record shows that there was no misunderstanding as to the basis of the complaint.19 The admission of evidence that would be inadmissible in judicial proceedings does not vitiate the order of an administrative agency.20 An administrative hearing may consider hearsay evidence, and hearsay may constitute by itself substantial evidence in support of an agency determination, provided that there are assurances of the underlying reliability and probative value of the evidence and the claimant before the agency had the opportunity to subpoena the witnesses and cross-examine them.21 However, a provision that an administrative body shall not be controlled by rules of evidence does not justify the issuance of orders without a foundation in evidence having rational probative force. Although the Court has recognized that in some circumstances a fair hearing implies a right to oral argument,22 it has refused to lay down a general rule that would cover all cases.23

17. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). See also Amdt14.S1.5.4.5 Impartial Decision Maker.
18. Margan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1938). The Court has applied this principle with differing results to administrative hearings and subsequent review in selective service cases. Compare Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955) (conscientious objector contesting his classification before appeals board must be furnished copy of recommendation submitted by Department of Justice; only by being appraised of the arguments and conclusions upon which recommendations were based would he be enabled to present his case effectively), with United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953) (in auxiliary hearing that culminated in a Justice Department report and recommendation, it is sufficient that registrant be provided with resume of adverse evidence in FBI report because the imperative needs of mobilization and national vigilance mandate a minimum of litigious interruption), and Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59 (1960) (finding no due process violation when petitioner at departmental proceedings was not permitted to rebut statements attributed to him by his local board, because the statements were in his file and he had opportunity to rebut both before hearing officer and appeal board; likewise finding no violation where petitioner at trial was denied access to hearing officer's notes and report, because he failed to show any need and did have Department recommendations).
19. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 349–50 (1938).
20. W. Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 268 (1926). See also United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274, 288 (1924).
21. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
22. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
23. FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 274–77 (1949). See also Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945). See Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C §§ 1001–1011). Cf. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 637, 646 (1962), in which the majority rejected Justice Black's dissenting thesis that the dismissal with prejudice of a damage suit without notice to the client and grounded upon the dilatory tactics of his attorney, and the latter's failure to appear at a pre-trial conference, amounted to a taking of property without due process of law.

Amdt14.S1.5.5.1 Overview of Procedural Due Process in Criminal Cases

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process affects procedures in state criminal cases in two ways. First, through the doctrine of incorporation, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause applies to the states nearly all the criminal procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights, including those of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.[1] Second, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause prohibits government practices and policies that violate precepts of fundamental fairness, even if they do not violate specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.[2] The procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable in scope to the limitations that the Fifth Amendment imposes on federal criminal proceedings.[3]
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1. Those provisions guarantee rights of criminal suspects and prisoners including the right to counsel, the right to speedy and public trial, the right to be free from use of unlawfully seized evidence and unlawfully obtained confessions, and the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishments. See Amdt14.S1.4.3 Modern Doctrine on Selective Incorporation of Bill of Rights.

2. For instance, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), held that, despite the absence of a specific constitutional provision requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, such proof is required by due process. See also, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1966 (2016) (holding that principles of due process did not prevent a defendant's prior uncounseled convictions in tribal court from being used as the basis for a sentence enhancement, as those convictions complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act, which itself contained requirements that ensure the reliability of tribal-court convictions); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (where sentencing enhancement scheme for habitual offenders found unconstitutional, defendant's sentence cannot be sustained, even if sentence falls within range of unenhanced sentences); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (conclusive presumptions in jury instruction may not be used to shift burden of proof of an element of crime to defendant); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (fairness of failure to give jury instruction on presumption of innocence evaluated under totality of circumstances); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (requiring, upon defense request, jury instruction on presumption of innocence); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (defendant may be required to bear burden of affirmative defense); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (sufficiency of jury instructions); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (a state cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (defendant may not be required to carry the burden of disproving an element of a crime for which he is charged); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (defendant may not be held to rule requiring disclosure to prosecution of an alibi defense unless defendant is given reciprocal discovery rights against the state); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (defendant may not be denied opportunity to explore confession of third party to crime for which defendant is charged).

The procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable in scope to the limitations that the Fifth Amendment imposes on federal criminal proceedings.[3]

The Court has explained, Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept. . . . What is fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others.[4] In assessing whether a challenged criminal procedure denies a person procedural due process, the Court generally considers whether the practice violates a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such government.[5] The Court has also held that, as applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice, and that to find a denial of due process the Court must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.[6]

Procedural due process analysis contains a historical component, as Supreme Court cases have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country.[7] The Court thus asks whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.[8]

3. While the following essays focus primarily on Supreme Court litigation challenging state criminal procedures, some of the cases cited discuss federal criminal procedures. See also Amdt5.6.1 Overview of Due Process Procedural Requirements. The doctrine of incorporation applies only to state government action in criminal cases, because the Bill of Rights applies directly to the federal government without any need for incorporation.

4. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934). See also Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943).

5. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). The Court has also phrased the question as whether a claimed right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, whether it partakes of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or whether it offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).

6. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).

7. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 n.14 (1968).

8. 8Id.

Amdt14.S1.6.1 Overview of Substantive Due Process

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clause—which prohibits the government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law—to protect certain fundamental constitutional rights from government interference, regardless of the procedures that the government follows when enforcing the law. These protected rights, though not listed in the Constitution, are deemed so fundamental that courts must subject government actions infringing on them to closer scrutiny. The Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, adopted as one of the Reconstruction Amendments after the Civil War, protects individuals from interference by state actions.[1]

Although the Court, in the immediate years following the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, declined to interpret the Due Process Clause as placing a substantive constraint on state actions, it went on to apply to robust notion of substantive due process to economic legislation prior to the Great Depression Era. During this period, the Court, recognizing liberty of contract as an interest protected by the Due Process Clause, struck down a variety of economic regulations as unconstitutional. The Court, however, ultimately retreated from the doctrine of economic substantive due process as the laissez-faire approach to economic regulation receded with the Great Depression.[2]

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt14-S1-6-1/ALDE_00013814/

1. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects individuals from federal government interference. For more about the substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment see Amdt5.7.1 Overview of Substantive Due Process Requirements.

2. See Amdt14.S1.6.2.1 Overview of Economic Substantive Due Process to Amdt14.S1.6.2.3 Laws Regulating Working Conditions and Wages.

In contrast to the Court's shift away from economic substantive due process, the Court continued to develop the doctrine of noneconomic due process during the twentieth century, invalidating several governmental actions as impermissibly infringing upon certain fundamental rights, including the right to use contraceptives, to marry, and to engage in certain adult consensual intimate conduct. Since the 1980s, however, the Court—with the exception of two cases involving the right of same-sex couples—has generally declined to invalidate government actions on substantive due process grounds. In 2022, the Court further signaled a potential retreat from noneconomic substantive due process when it reversed the position it had held for nearly five decades to hold that the right to abortion is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right.[3]

3. See Amdt14.S1.6.3.1 Overview of Noneconomic Substantive Due Process to Amdt14.S1.6.5.3 Civil Commitment and Substantive Due Process.

Conclusion to this Notice

The Michigan Attorney General has declined to redress the weaponization against the people. Her conflict resides in the fact she is the trustee and fiduciary to manage the Charitable Trust and a B.A.R. member.

SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES ACT (EXCERPT)
Act 101 of 1961

14.254 Attorney general; jurisdiction and control; parties represented; powers and duties; probate of will; notice; procedures; register of trusts and trustees.

Sec. 4.

(a) The attorney general shall have jurisdiction and control and shall represent the people of the state and the uncertain or indefinite beneficiaries in all charitable trusts in this state, and may enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the courts of this state.

(b) The attorney general is a necessary party to all court proceedings (1) to terminate a charitable trust or to liquidate or distribute its assets, or (2) to modify or depart from the objects or purposes of a charitable trust as the same are set forth in the instrument governing the trust, including any proceeding for the application of the doctrine of cy pres, or (3) to construe the provisions of an instrument with respect to a charitable trust. A judgment rendered in such proceedings without service of process and pleadings upon the attorney general, shall be voidable, unenforceable, and be set aside at the option of the attorney general upon his motion seeking such relief. The attorney general shall intervene in any proceedings affecting a charitable trust subject to this act, when requested to do so by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, and may intervene in any proceedings affecting a charitable trust when he determines that the public interest should be protected in such proceedings. With respect to such proceedings, no compromise, settlement agreement, contract or judgment agreed to by any or all parties having or claiming to have an interest in any charitable trust shall be valid unless the attorney general was made a party to such proceedings and joined in the compromise, settlement agreement, contract or judgment, or unless the attorney general, in writing, waives his right to participate therein. The attorney general is expressly authorized to enter into such compromise, settlement agreement, contract or judgment as in his opinion may be in the best interests of the people of the state and the uncertain or indefinite beneficiaries.

(c) Whenever a petition is filed for probate of a last will and testament containing any residuary bequest or devise to a trustee, as hereinbefore defined, or if such will creates or purports to create a charitable trust, the petitioner shall serve notice upon the attorney general, charitable trust division, of the pendency of the proceedings, and the probate judge shall make available and shall forward to the attorney general a copy of the petition

for probate of will and a copy of the instruments filed for admission to probate. The notice and documents shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, not less than 14 days before the hearing date. The judge of probate shall not pass upon the petition in the absence of filing of proof of mailing. Upon entering his appearance, the attorney general shall become a necessary party in interest in the estate proceedings, either in the probate court or by way of appeal.

(d) The attorney general shall establish and maintain a register of charitable trusts and trustees subject to this act and of the particular trust or other relationship under which they hold property for charitable purposes and shall conduct whatever investigation is necessary, and shall obtain from public records, all courts of record, court officers, taxing authorities, trustees, and other sources, whatever information, copies of instruments, reports and records needed for the establishment and maintenance of the register and files. The attorney general shall be authorized to require the necessary information and documents, necessary to discharge the requirements of this act, and to require true or certified copies thereof to be furnished him, and all public officials shall provide same, without payment of any fee or charge whatsoever.

History: 1961, Act 101, Eff. Sept. 8, 1961 ;-- Am. 1965, Act 353, Eff. Mar. 31, 1966

Pursuant to 600.4501 Quo warranto; attorney general; private party.

Sec. 4501.

The attorney general shall bring an action for quo warranto when the facts clearly warrant the bringing of that action. If the attorney general receives information from a private party and refuses to act, that private party may bring the action upon leave of court.

History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963

A public question being involved, no costs may be taxed under MCR 7.219. This opinion shall have immediate effect pursuant to MCR 7.215(F)(2). chrome-extension:/efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https:/www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/opinions/final/coa/20160617_c333225(53)_rptr_90o-333225-final.pdf?fbclid=IwAR22Xgm91HHitp1-jKFec_vOdxwXYdubAxLhvxCmWlkLKUobfYBQhkKsWNo

Desist and Cease

Supervisory Control

To all state officers; appointed, hired, or elected.

You are here by given notice from the people of michigan, of estoppel on the use of trespass on the people in this manner.

By:/s/Shannon Tanis©

August,14th, 2023